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Abstract
Several countries experienced an increase in female labor participa-
tion during the twentieth century. Even so, few can be proud of the con-
ditions female workers faced. This paper analyzes the occupational dis-
tribution by gender from 1978 to in 2007 in Brazil. It shows that women
have penetrated traditionally male occupations to a certain extent, but
that traditionally female occupations have maintained their gender com-
position over the past 30 years. We also provide a regression analysis with
an Oaxaca decomposition that shows that the gender wage gap is lower
than in 1978, but that it has remained constant over the last decade.
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1 Introduction
Virtually all countries experienced an increase in female labor participation
during the twentieth century. Even so, few can be proud of the conditions that
female workers face in dealing with family responsibilities and the labor mar-
ket. The division of labor within families continues to fall along traditional
gender lines, even when women engage in labor market activities. Women
who are engaged in the labor market are still expected to be available to com-
ply with their family responsibilities of housework, childcare and other activi-
ties (Hersch & Stratton 1994, Alvarez et al. 2006, Lundberg 2008, Madalozzo
et al. 2008, Gupta & Ash 2008). Further, women continue to receive lower
wages than men, even when controlling for personal characteristics and job
attributes (Blau & Kahn 1997, Bertrand & Hallock 2001, Albrecht et al. 2003,
Bayard et al. 2003, Bucheli & Sanroman 2005, Galarza et al. 2006, Madalozzo
& Martins 2007, Olivetti & Petrongolo 2008). There is no consensus among
specialists as to whether a gendered division of labor at home causes the wage
gap or vice versa. However, the majority of studies agree that some intrinsic
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features of gender have a significant influence on these outcomes of a lower
wage and second shift.
One possibility is that the career interruptions that women experience dur-
ing their reproductive life1 make them less productive on the labor market
and, therefore, available to work for lower wage rates (Deloach & Hoffman
2002, Hersch & Stratton 2002, Moe 2003, Blau et al. 2006, Bryan & Sanz
2007). Another possibility is that women’s wages are lower because they ac-
count for benefits that are available only to women, for example, maternity
leave (Waldfogel 1998, Edwards 2006, Bergmann 2008). As a final point, an-
other possibility is that women choose to work in occupations and activities
with lower remuneration than those chosen by men (Easterlin 1995, Macpher-
son & Hirsch 1995, Miller 2009). Any of these possibilities may impact – or
be impacted by – the gender division of labor by making it less costly to the
household for women to spend more hours at home instead of men; if both
spouses are equally productive to the market, but the husband receives higher
remuneration for his work than his wife, he has a comparative advantage in
dedicating more time and effort to the market (Ferber 2003).
Our focus in this study is to analyze female labor participation in Brazil
since the 1970s. Brazil is a highly unequal country in several aspects. It has
one of the worst Gini indexes in the world, 0.567, and had the 10th worst in-
come distribution in the world in 2007. Concerning gender differences, Brazil
ranked 74th out of 127 countries in the 2007World Economic Forum’s Gender
Gap index, with a score of 0.664.2 Using data from 1978 to 2007 will allow us
to understand two different problems related to women’s labor participation:
occupational segregation and the gender wage gap over time.
Female labor participation in Brazil increased substantially during the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century, as depicted in Figure 1. In 1950, roughly
14 percent of females participated in the labor market. By 1980, this num-
ber had nearly doubled to 27 percent. The 1980s was the decade that wit-
nessed the biggest inclusion of women in the labor market and by 1992, 47
percent of women were engaged in some economic activity or were seeking
work. Since them, female inclusion in the labor market has slowly continued
to grow. In 2007, 52.4 percent of women were economically active. Nev-
ertheless, women’s working conditions in the labor market and within their
households has remained inequitable.
Other studies have analyzed labor market conditions for women in Brazil.
Bruschini (1989, 1998) reported the trends for the female labor market re-
garding insertion and intermittency. The present research continues these
analyses into the new century. In addition, we use econometric resources
to evaluate female entries into industry and occupations and to compare fe-
male and male wages, controlling for individual characteristics. Giuberti &
Menezes-Filho (2005), Jacinto (2005) and Batista & Cacciamali (2009) all used
the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology to compare earning differentials between
men and women, though each of these studies had a different focus.3 Com-
1Labor intermittency caused by marriage, childbirth or other family needs involving the
woman.
2Where one represents complete equal treatment between genders and zero, total inequal-
ity. The gender gap index considers four dimensions: economic participation and opportunity,
educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment.
3Garcia et al. (2009) use the matching approach to infer the gender wage gap. Their results
are very similar to those reported in this study.
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Figure 1: Labor Market Participation. Male and Female, 1950–
2007.
plementing their work, we expanded the period analyzed and emphasized the
role of occupation choice in wage profiles. Our analyses target the average dif-
ferences in labor market earnings for men and women for the period between
1978 and 2007. Finally, Scorzafave & Pazello (2007) also studied the gender
wage gap in Brazil, however their goal was to apply normalized equations to
solve the indetermination problem of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition ap-
proach. We use their methodology in our research to better understand the
impact of the occupation transition process on narrowing the gender wage
gap during this period.4
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section we describe Brazil-
ian labor characteristics, focusing on activities and gender differentials. Sec-
tion 3 explains the empirical model used to analyze the gender gap in remu-
neration and the impact of occupational differentials. The results are pre-
sented in Section 4. Section 5 offers conclusions.
2 The Brazilian labor market: are there gender differences?
In this section, we describe Brazilian labor markets and highlight the differ-
ences and similarities between genders with regard to them. Before entering
into such a discussion, however, it is necessary to explain some peculiarities
of the Brazilian labor market. First, it is highly regulated. Since the 1930s,
with the implementation of the first laws concerning employment in Brazil,
there have been an increased number of restrictions and fees employers must
pay to be able to hire individuals. The constitution of 1988 aggravated this
problem. Second, women have gained specific rights to maternity leave. Be-
fore 1988, all female workers had the right to a fully paid maternity leave
of 90 days. The new constitution increased this right to 120 days. In 2007,
4By no means do these cited studies cover the entire body of literature on the gender wage
gap in Brazil. However, the studies presented here are closely related to the goals and methods
of this paper.
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new federal legislation was passed in response to the World Health Organiza-
tion’s recommendation that babies should be breastfed for 6 months. Under
this law, female workers may opt to take 6 months of maternity leave, also
fully paid by the employer.5 These stringent regulations on the labor market
are the concern of many researchers, who question their ability to guarantee
workers’ rights by suggesting that such regulations may force workers into
informal jobs, where they will have no rights at all.
Our analysis used microdata from PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra
por Domicílios, which translates to National Survey of Sampled Households).
PNAD is an annual survey conducted by the Brazilian Bureau of Statistics,
IBGE. It takes a representative sample of Brazilian households and studies,
among other aspects of the population, labor, education and health. It con-
tains data at an individual level for the sampled dwellings. Since 2004, PNAD
has investigated data for all national territory.6 With the purpose of analyz-
ing the past and current employment trends, we used data from four different
decades: 1978, 1988, 1998, and 2007, the most recent data released by IBGE.
Questionnaires were modified during this period; however, we made some
concatenations in order to make them comparable.
Table 1 presents the female distribution among different occupation cat-
egories.7 For each year, we divided the occupations into traditionally male
or traditionally female.8 It can be observed that the majority of occupa-
tions remain majority male over time (for example, carpenters, mechanics,
drivers, etc.), while others maintain their tendency to be female-dominated
occupations (including nurses, librarians, and schoolteachers). Nevertheless,
some changes are visible. While in 1978 only 4.94 percent of engineers were
women, in 2007 more than 10 percent of engineers were female. This is still
a small number of individuals; however, it establishes a change in pattern.
Other examples of traditionally male occupations that are being occupied by
increasing numbers women are insurance agents, police and detectives, and
managers and administrators.
On the other side, traditionally female occupations rarely present such a
change. There are a few possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first
is that men resist engaging in activities that are regarded as “female.” This
would reflect gender preferences for certain activities and against others. His-
torically, women engaged in market activities closely related to their domestic
work (Folbre 1994). Considering that men have historically been distant from
such work, it is plausible to infer that males would prefer a different type
of activity and, therefore, favor traditionally male occupations.It may also be
the case that this difference is related to worker discrimination (Kaufman &
Hotchkiss 2003). This would be the case if men charged a premium to work
5Up to a ceiling of 12 thousand Reais, maternity leave is paid by the employer who is reim-
bursed by the government in taxes. This is a very high ceiling. Less than 3 percent of female
workers earn more than this value monthly.
6Until then, 1.9 percent of the Brazilian population was not included in the sample because
they lived in areas not researched. However, the analysis contains weights that allow for compar-
ison with earlier years.
7This table was inspired by Table 8.3, in Kaufman & Hotchkiss (2003, p.425).
8It may be pointed out that there is a very high level variation in the number of individuals
in some categories. For instance, the number of individuals that claim to be economists in 2007
is well above the expected increase in the population. However, the result is conditional on the
individual weight assigned to the population. Even when the weight is corrected for individual
characteristics, it may still distort individual data, such as occupation.
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Table 1: Percentage of females in traditionally male and traditionally female
occupations.
Traditionally Male Occupations
Occupation 1978 1988 1998 2007
Engineers 4.94
[4,778]
2.47
[455]
8.35
[15,682]
10.08
[29,382]
Lawyers 18.18
[15,386]
25.86
[3,708]
38.40
[104,003]
43.86
[207,225]
Physicians 18.29
[14,144]
22.07
[4,285]
48.15
[106,848]
42.87
[96,607]
Economists 18.76
[3,864]
16.84
[665]
32.44
[13,451]
76.13
[228,013]
Clergy 20.54
[5,249]
14.25
[1,060]
27.79
[24,984]
24.96
[33,676]
Insurance agents 10.46
[2,424]
0.00
[0]
28.69
[14,625]
32.69
[32,178]
Managers and administrators 16.77
[92,505]
17.10
[26,282]
28.59
[295,689]
36.48
[1,609,614]
Carpenters 1.05
[2,011]
0.28
[207]
2.20
[13,349]
2.04
[8,108]
Auto mechanics 0.29
[1,110]
1.19
[1,132]
0.47
[3,351]
1.36
[9,286]
Telephone line installers 0.76
[195]
0.00
[0]
6.28
[1,620]
3.05
[3,393]
Drivers 0.17
[2,070]
0.40
[895]
1.20
[25,395]
1.59
[39,580]
Police and Detectives 2.28
[1,746]
11.86
[1,348]
11.71
[17,188]
12.23
[27,822]
Traditionally Female Occupations
Occupation 1978 1988 1998 2007
Registered nurses 86.94
[247,258]
89.92
[40,139]
86.83
[59,379]
86.48
[87,428]
Librarians 89.56
[14,847]
82.10
[3,595]
92.55
[14,769]
79.41
[4,259]
Schoolteachers 90.58
[796,709]
88.87
[88,539]
91.41
[1,261,264]
81.54
[1,942,572]
Bank tellers 54.70
[119,922]
72.43
[38,834]
51.94
[115,502]
55.51
[49,831]
Secretaries 52.23
[944,816]
98.26
[36,688]
61.48
[194,194]
62.39
[1,362,068]
Typists 37.04
[56,654]
26.25
[2,699]
91.82
[372,472]
13.40
[6,007]
Sewing machine operators 95.17
[844,866]
97.00
[144,360]
93.54
[1,200,793]
91.99
[1,213,158]
Dental assistants 22.53
[10,467]
22.87
[2,303]
53.49
[56,295]
55.27
[90,547]
Child care workers − 100.00
[6,739]
97.86
[407,142]
97.76
[305,128]
Source: PNADs and author’s tabulation.
All estimations are weighted by the individual weight available in the database.
(Between squared brackets is the number of observations in the sample, using the
appropriate weight.
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with women in a “female job.” In that case, the premium could be so high
that firm owners prefer to hire only women because they are less costly. An-
other alternative is that society resists having men in these occupations. For
example, male nurses may be less socially desirable than female nurses. A
man who chooses to become a nurse may be viewed as a “failed doctor” more
easily than a woman.9 This explanation is commonly known as “consumer
prejudice” (Patterson & Engelberg 1978).
These differences in occupations and industry choices may be determi-
nants of the remuneration discrepancy between genders. In order to better
control this effect, Table 2 provides the individuals’ hourly pay by occupation
and gender10 for 1978 and 2007. Table 3 does the same for economic sector
and gender.
Using the same categories analyzed in Table 1, it can be seen that, in most
cases, men have higher salaries than women. In 1978, for only two occupa-
tions, drivers and librarians, did females have a higher average salary than
males. For another 16 occupations, men received higher remuneration than
women. In 2007, the situation is slightly different: in 12 occupations, men
earn greater wages than women and, for three others, women earn higher
wages than men (auto mechanics, drivers, and police and detectives). With
no controls for education and industry, which we examine in the next section,
it appears that there has been little change in the gender wage gap over a long
period of time.
Concerning industry sectors, Table 3 shows that men typically received
higher wages than women in the past. However, in one activity, women’s
salaries are higher: construction. This is also one of the activities with lower
female engagement. One possible explanation for this premium on female
wages is individual selection. In order to participate in this industry, women
have to be so different from the average that they receive higher wages than
men. Analyzing the education distribution among industries, it can be seen
that in the construction industry women are more educated than men. In
1978, almost 60 percent of females in the construction industry had 9 or more
years of education (completed the primary level of education), while less than
8 percent of males in this industry had this level of education. In 2007, 68
percent of women in this industry had more than 9 years of education, while
21 percent of men were in the same condition.
This question raises the importance of analyzing the degree of education.
Comparing 1978 and 2007 data, we can see some different trends by gender
in Table 4. In 1978, men with a low level of education were concentrated in
the agribusiness sector. Women with no education were also in agribusiness,
but those who had a small amount of education (1 to 4 years) were in services.
Men who had 5 to 11 years of education were in the transformation indus-
try, while women at this level were generally in the services and the social
sector. Individuals of both genders with more than 11 years of education are
more concentrated in the social sector. The picture in 2007 is a little differ-
ent. Men with low education levels continue to work in agribusiness (until 4
years of education), and women in services. However, after finishing the basic
9Anecdotal evidence of this can be seen in the Hollywood hit movie “Meet the Parents,”
where the parents of the fiancée avoid saying that their future son-in-law is a nurse.
10Here we do not control for hours of work or qualification (education degree, for example).
These additional controls and others will be the focus of the next sections, with the regression
model.
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Table 2: Hourly wage by gender and occupation: 1978 and 2007.
1978 2007
Occupation Men Women Men Women
Engineers 178.55
[513]
158.88
[23]
∗ 31.00
[476]
22.45
[64]
Lawyers 206.96
[397]
135.82
[103]
∗ 22.84
[515]
19.32
[384]
∗
Physicians 263.65
[383]
125.52
[96]
∗ 51.23
[260]
35.15
[196]
∗
Economists 246.08
[117]
130.70
[38]
∗ 23.29
[136]
14.74
[467]
∗
Clergy 34.85
[100]
14.40
[24]
∗ 7.22
[217]
3.99
[75]
∗
Insurance agents 69.06
[122]
80.63
[13]
13.51
[110]
11.89
[49]
Managers and administrators 99.08
[2,546]
70.11
[618]
∗ 17.97
[5534]
15.34
[3294]
∗
Carpenters 21.69
[931]
8.56
[8]
∗ 4.36
[814]
2.26
[15]
∗
Auto mechanics 24.04
[1,768]
10.70
[4]
∗ 4.95
[1382]
8.30
[21]
∗
Telephone line installers 34.54
[140]
19.79
[1]
∗ 5.36
[200]
4.64
[4]
∗
Drivers 27.13
[5,549]
38.04
[11]
∗ 6.36
[4831]
8.42
[75]
∗
Police and Detectives 52.64
[440]
43.43
[12]
∗ 12.47
[448]
15.44
[53]
∗
Registered nurses 31.38
[190]
22.76
[1322]
12.40
[24]
12.76
[177]
Librarians 26.60
[8]
51.22
[97]
∗ 91.61
[2]
11.86
[10]
Schoolteachers 55.65
[429]
33.31
[4174]
∗ 9.87
[932]
8.75
[3882]
∗
Bank tellers 51.43
[531]
22.36
[635]
∗ 12.48
[70]
9.02
[72]
∗
Secretaries 32.70
[4,694]
29.56
[5251]
∗ 7.43
[1715]
5.93
[2764]
∗
Typists 28.00
[553]
22.12
[394]
∗ 8.01
[70]
2.81
[11]
∗
Sewing machine operators 30.26
[213]
12.57
[4090]
∗ 3.29
[212]
3.25
[2495]
Dental assistants 192.14
[214]
133.04
[69]
∗ 23.58
[138]
21.64
[169]
Child care workers 6.79
[18]
7.00
[564]
Source: PNADs and author’s tabulation.
All estimations are weighted by the individual weight available in the database.
* Indicates that the female and male values are different at 95% confidence interval
Between square brackets is the number of observations in the sample, using the
appropriate weight
154 Regina Madalozzo Economia Aplicada, v.14, n.2
Table 3: Hourly wage by gender and industries: 1978 and 2007.
1978 2007
Activity Men Women Men Women
Agricultural 14.86 6.49∗ 3.10 0.91∗
Transformation Industry 38.11 17.42∗ 7.12 4.33∗
Construction 23.21 38.82∗ 4.72 19.72∗
General Industry 31.46 33.10 10.45 11.02
Commerce 38.26 21.81∗ 6.48 4.83∗
Services 40.00 12.30∗ 7.65 3.56∗
Transportation 32.67 26.39∗ 7.28 7.45
Social Services 74.35 32.77∗ 13.45 8.26∗
Public Administration 50.08 45.15∗ 12.02 10.99∗
Other Activities 78.14 38.85∗ 9.12 7.04∗
Source: PNADs and author’s tabulation.
All estimations are weighted by the individual weight available in the
database.
∗ female and male values are different at the 95 percent confidence interval.
level of education, i.e., 4 years, men are employed in commerce. Women, for
their part, continue to be concentrated in services until completing the fun-
damental level of education, i.e., 8 years, and after that, they compose a larger
fraction of commerce.
3 Econometric model to calculate discrimination between
genders
The previous analysis illustrates that male and female workers have different
allocations within and returns to the labor market in Brazil. We now present
an econometric analysis in order to control for distinct influences on individ-
ual remuneration. Using this procedure, we will also be able to measure the
impact of occupational choices and individual characteristics on the hourly
wage.
The basic model follows Mincer (1995). The mincerian equation relates
the hourly wage with individual demographics and job definitions, as shown
by equation (1).
lnwi = α +
k∑
j=1
βjXi +
m∑
s=1
γsZi + εi , (1)
where wi is the hourly wage for individual i and Xi are the demographics for
individual i. Zi represents dummy variables for activities and occupations for
each individual11 .
By demographics, we mean individual age and its squared value (to ac-
count for the concavity on remuneration), residence region12 and education
dummies.13 Zi is composed of both occupation and industry dummies. For
11Excluded category is Agricultural Business.
12Excluded category is Southeast, the richest Brazilian region.
13Excluded category ‘no education’. Other categories are: basic (1 to 4 years), fundamental (5
to 8 years), high school (9 to 11 years) and college or more (12 or more years).
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Table 4: Percentagemale and female by education and industry: 1978
and 2007.
1978
years of education
0 1 to 4 5 to 8 9 to 11 12 +
Male Workers
Agribusiness 62.82 30.92 9.28 3.39 1.39
Transformation 8.67 19.73 24.87 24.65 19.92
Construction 11.40 14.71 9.71 4.78 5.54
Other industrial activities 1.86 2.38 2.13 3.22 3.13
Commerce 5.45 9.75 15.55 17.10 7.66
Services 4.68 9.82 14.59 13.57 15.05
Transportation and Communication 2.68 6.87 9.47 6.17 3.34
Social 0.74 1.77 3.50 5.63 21.03
Public Administration 1.10 2.99 7.87 10.39 13.23
Other activities 0.59 1.07 3.03 11.11 9.71
Female Workers
Agribusiness 49.00 23.37 5.55 0.37 0.06
Transformation 6.71 14.00 17.68 11.16 6.89
Construction 0.10 0.24 0.47 1.29 1.55
Other industrial activities 0.32 0.28 0.31 1.05 1.56
Commerce 3.72 7.82 17.25 12.85 4.08
Services 35.87 42.26 31.07 12.27 7.70
Transportation and Communication 0.20 0.72 1.90 2.78 2.03
Social 2.65 8.95 20.00 43.35 57.74
Public Administration 0.39 1.06 3.33 7.35 10.46
Other activities 1.04 1.29 2.43 7.55 7.94
2007
years of education
0 1 to 4 5 to 8 9 to 11 12 +
Male Workers
Agribusiness 53.37 35.28 15.30 5.78 1.82
Transformation 7.95 12.11 18.36 21.93 13.70
Construction 14.54 18.55 16.50 7.07 3.43
Other industrial activities 0.84 0.93 1.13 1.83 1.66
Commerce 9.84 13.20 21.04 24.69 16.05
Services 2.86 3.27 3.72 3.95 4.86
Transportation and Communication 3.75 6.87 9.91 9.07 5.20
Social 0.67 1.01 1.40 3.53 16.42
Public Administration 2.03 2.67 3.12 7.89 13.38
Other activities 4.15 6.09 9.51 14.25 23.47
Female Workers
Agribusiness 44.39 31.19 11.32 2.93 0.59
Transformation 8.12 11.74 16.08 14.21 6.87
Construction 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.55 0.95
Other industrial activities 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.26 0.68
Commerce 8.32 9.43 15.36 25.48 11.86
Services 27.98 33.26 36.66 18.25 4.78
Transportation and Communication 0.31 0.42 0.85 2.43 2.55
Social 3.51 5.16 6.59 17.70 44.52
Public Administration 1.25 1.46 2.10 5.21 10.67
Other activities 5.71 6.90 10.57 12.98 16.53
Source: PNADs and author’s tabulation.
All estimations are weighted by the individual weight available in the database.
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all years, we used the classification of these variables on two and three-digit
dummies. Here, it is necessary to point out the endogeneity of these latter
variables, especially occupation. It is well known that occupational choices
are made according to individual preferences, and that such choices imply
different levels of remuneration, linking the dependent variable with this in-
dividual choice. An instrumental variable could be used to correct for this
problem. Unfortunately, the database used in this study does not allow for
the construction of such a variable. Therefore, we continue to control for oc-
cupation and industry choice while ignoring this possible effect, but using the
same methodology used in the literature.
We were also able to test for the influence of occupational distinction of
authority onwages. Budig & England (2001) created a dummy variable for au-
thority in their study on the wage penalty of motherhood. This variable was
constructed by coding all occupations that have the words “management,”
“supervisor” or “foreman” in their description as one. As a dependent vari-
able, they used the natural log of hourly wage in the respondent’s current
job. They find that mothers are less likely to be in jobs involving authority;
however, this does not seem to affect the estimated motherhood penalty. In
our work, “authority” was included as a variable of job characteristics. This
variable is a dummy, coded one for occupational categories with titles contain-
ing the words “supervisor,” “manager” or “director.” We used this additional
variable only for the 2007 data, which is more complete. Also, for 2007, we
included race dummies14 and tenure on the job15 in order to have a more
complete set of controls.16
Since the main purpose of this study is to analyze female labor characteris-
tics, we estimated equation (1) separately for men and women using ordinary
least squares. We did not use a Heckman correction for the female equation
because we are concerned only with working individuals.17 These regressions
result in two different outcomes, posed as equations (2) and (3).
lnwFi = αˆ
F +
k∑
j=1
βˆFj X
F
i +
m∑
s=1
γˆFs Z
F
i + εi (2)
lnwMi = αˆ
M +
k∑
j=1
βˆMj X
M
i +
m∑
s=1
γˆMs Z
M
i + εi , (3)
where equation (2) uses only female data to estimate the coefficients, and
equation (3) uses the male data to this end. These features allow us use the
Oaxaca (1973) method to estimate the male–female differences not explained
by individual characteristics.
14Excluded category is White; other categories are Black, Mulato, Asian and Native.
15Excluded category is “less than 6 months”; other categories are “6 months to 1 year,” “1 to 2
years,” “2 to 5 years” and “more then 5 years.”
16Since 1976, IBGE changed the PNAD questionnaires many times. We do not have all of the
basic variables for all years. Therefore, we estimated a more complete equation only for 2007,
but kept the “basic” regression for all years for comparison.
17The current literature on gender wage gap usually avoids using a Heckman selection because
it is less compatible with Oaxaca methodology. However, when it is used, results do not change
significantly, as demonstrated by Galarza et al. (2006). As a test, we performed the estimation
using a Heckman correction to our data, and also got results compatible with those presented in
this paper.
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Themale-female wage differential can be posed in two parts: the explained
portion of the differential (explained by the different characteristics of men
and women) and the unexplained differential.
Using the estimated coefficients for female and male individuals, we cal-
culate the hourly wage one individual would receive if he or she were male
and, the alternative possibility, if he or she were female. We use these compu-
tations to determine the wage differential that is not explained by observable
characteristics, as shown in equation (4):
Dˆi =
∑
j
βˆMj Xi −
∑
j
βˆFj Xi . (4)
We compare the estimated value of equation (4) for each individual and
use the population average for this variable as the estimation of the non-
explained portion of the gender wage gap across the years. The greater the
value of the difference in the sample, the greater the gender discrimination in
the sample.18 In the next section, we present the results.
4 And the difference between genders is. . .
We estimate equations (2) and (3) separately for the different samples (1978,
1988, 1998 and 2007). As mentioned earlier, for 2007, because of the avail-
ability of additional variables, we included extra controls for race, tenure and
authority. Our baseline regression includes demographics, industry sector
and two-digit occupational controls. The final model also includes occupa-
tional codes with three digits.19 All of our estimations were calculated using
the individual weight available in the PNAD, as well as robust standard errors
to correct for heteroscedasticity.
Tables 5 through 8 show the estimated results, disaggregated by gender.
Columns (1) and (3) refer to the male results, and columns (2) and (4) refer to
female results. For all years, we find a positive effect of age, with concavity
expressed by the variable age squared. These effects are expected, because
they reflect the worker’s experience with the labor market. The concavity
is verified because the incremental value of experience along the years has
decreasing returns to productivity and, consequently, to individual remuner-
ation. Some studies use the age variable as a proxy for experience. However,
this is not a good approach to infer women’s labor experience, because they
experience time out of the labor market to have and raise children. Therefore,
the variable “age” measures the impact of age itself, more so than labor ex-
perience. In order to have some control for labor experience, the regression
18The D statistic can either be an overestimation or underestimation of discrimination. Not all
of the differences verified on variable D can be considered discrimination per se. As the available
microdata are not complete for the individual characteristics, we only can affirm that we control
for the “observable” characteristics of each individual, and the D statistic represents the effect
of “non-observable” characteristics available to neither the researcher nor the labor contractors.
Therefore, any remaining differences would be the result of some sort of gender discrimination.
On the other hand, Dmay underestimate the discrimination because we control for characteristics
like occupation, and, if there is non-market discrimination that induces women to opt for easier
and worse remunerated occupations, we would not see it on the final estimation. See Oaxaca
(1973).
19We have a different number of categories for each year, being more specific in recent years.
However, for all samples we used the most detailed variable available.
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Table 5: Estimation Results, 1978.
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.36
(13.06)
0.17
(3.52)
2.11
(19.38)
1.47
(4.92)
Age 0.08
(52.40)
0.08
(29.51)
0.06
(41.95)
0.07
(26.72)
Age Squared −0.00
(−40.56)
−0.00
(−22.36)
−0.00
(−31.92)
−0.00
(−20.44)
South −0.17
(−21.98)
−0.25
(−20.87)
−0.18
(−24.80)
−0.24
(−20.06)
North −0.24
(−18.88)
−0.34
(−19.80)
−0.23
(−19.30)
−0.34
(−20.16)
Northeast −0.38
(−60.52)
−0.69
(−65.20)
−0.40
(−63.88)
−0.65
(−62.71)
Center −0.09
(−9.08)
−0.21
(−14.38)
−0.10
(−9.93)
−0.20
(−14.56)
Education 1 0.33
(48.51)
0.30
(22.31)
0.25
(37.95)
0.21
(16.65)
Education 2 0.63
(68.50)
0.59
(35.09)
0.49
(53.90)
0.45
(27.80)
Education 3 1.00
(78.26)
0.92
(47.76)
0.83
(66.77)
0.79
(41.07)
Education 4 1.69
(104.70)
1.55
(70.46)
1.30
(75.93)
1.24
(54.42)
Transformation Industry 0.09
(4.69)
−0.09
(−0.75)
0.29
(10.46)
0.56
(4.54)
Construction −0.03
(−1.42)
0.12
(0.98)
0.27
(9.30)
0.67
(5.24)
General Industry 0.02
(0.74)
0.01
(0.01)
0.28
(8.85)
0.70
(5.37)
Commerce −0.07
(−3.19)
−0.15
(−1.29)
0.24
(8.08)
0.43
(3.48)
Services −0.01
(−0.75)
−0.17
(−1.50)
0.19
(6.36)
0.41
(3.28)
Transportation 0.22
(9.86)
0.01
(0.01)
0.37
(12.69)
0.57
(4.51)
Social Services −0.12
(−4.87)
−0.21
(−1.80)
0.22
(6.95)
0.48
(3.93)
Public Administration 0.13
(5.71)
0.08
(0.71)
0.28
(8.88)
0.70
(5.64)
Other Activities 0.21
(8.14)
0.25
(2.20)
0.54
(15.93)
0.90
(7.20)
Occupations 2 digits Yes Yes No No
Occupations 3 digits No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.5267 0.5497 0.5829 0.5979
Number of Observations 103142 44493 103142 44493
Between parentheses are the t-statistics for each coefficient. All
regressions have robust standard errors estimations
All estimations are weighted by the individual weight available in
the database.
for 2007 also includes the variable “tenure on the job,” which captures part of
this effect.
The second variable category is the regional dummies. Except for 2007,
Southeast, the excluded category, has the greatest positive impact on wages
for both men and women. In 2007, it is possible to verify that Center is the
region with higher wages for both men and women in all regressions. This
may be an effect of migration to the Southeast, which began in the 1960s and
stabilized at the end of the 1990s as growth registered in the Central region,
which was poorly occupied until the end of the 1980s.20
20During the 1950s, the capital city of Brazil moved from Rio de Janeiro (Southeast) to Brasilia
(Center). However, the population boom in the region continued until the 1980s, not only in
the new capital but also in other states such as Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, where
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Table 6: Estimation Results, 1988.
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 2.89
(15.15)
3.18
(14.35)
4.75
(16.12)
4.69
(14.60)
Age 0.08
(8.31)
0.06
(4.90)
0.06
(6.06)
0.04
(3.04)
Age Squared −0.00
(−6.36)
−0.00
(−3.45)
−0.00
(−4.61)
−0.00
(−2.16)
South −0.21
(−4.62)
−0.15
(−2.38)
−0.22
(−4.55)
−0.15
(−2.30)
North −0.01
(−0.02)
−0.12
(−1.66)
0.01
(0.14)
−0.16
(−2.08)
Northeast −0.49
(−9.91)
−0.66
(−9.19)
−0.49
(−9.73)
−0.68
(−8.54)
Center −0.14
(−3.12)
−0.09
(−1.70)
−0.10
(−2.27)
−0.11
(−1.91)
Education 1 0.38
(8.43)
0.39
(5.55)
0.28
(6.07)
0.28
(3.95)
Education 2 0.68
(12.53)
0.63
(6.18)
0.50
(9.00)
0.46
(4.29)
Education 3 1.09
(14.08)
1.10
(9.09)
0.86
(11.09)
0.93
(7.29)
Education 4 1.73
(20.60)
1.80
(11.17)
1.34
(13.18)
1.46
(7.40)
Transformation Industry 0.20
(2.24)
−0.69
(−0.97)
0.38
(3.43)
0.29
(1.15)
Construction −0.07
(−0.81)
−0.61
(−0.84)
0.28
(2.46)
0.76
(2.28)
General Industry 0.33
(2.86)
−0.02
(−0.03)
0.56
(3.63)
0.85
(2.77)
Commerce −0.01
(−0.13)
−0.68
(−0.99)
0.28
(2.28)
0.35
(1.39)
Services −0.10
(−0.88)
−0.85
(−1.24)
−0.02
(−0.14)
0.13
(0.53)
Transportation 0.28
(2.77)
−0.31
(−0.43)
0.51
(4.56)
0.41
(1.19)
Social Services −0.01
(−0.01)
−0.66
(−0.95)
0.26
(1.48)
0.37
(1.35)
Public Administration −0.10
(−0.98)
−0.48
(−0.67)
0.17
(1.52)
0.57
(2.23)
Other Activities 0.50
(3.98)
−0.30
(−0.43)
0.65
(4.86)
0.82
(3.34)
Occupations2 digits Yes Yes No No
Occupations3 digits No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.3468 0.3781 0.4057 0.4571
Number of Observations 7087 3085 7087 3085
Between parentheses are the t-statistics for each coefficient. All
regressions have robust standard errors estimations
All estimations are weighted by the individual weight available in
the database.
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Table 7: Estimation Results, 1998.
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −1.78
(−52.83)
−1.72
(−35.25)
−0.45
(−6.43)
−0.60
(−1.63)
Age 0.07
(40.32)
0.06
(23.79)
0.06
(34.23)
0.05
(20.67)
Age Squared −0.00
(−31.77)
−0.00
(−17.10)
−0.00
(−27.07)
−0.00
(−15.09)
South −0.08
(−10.11)
−0.09
(−17.10)
−0.08
(−10.41)
−0.10
(−10.08)
North −0.26
(−21;64)
−0.26
(−8.72)
−0.26
(−22.11)
−0.27
(−19.18)
Northeast −0.43
(−57.64)
−0.50
(−17.79)
−0.42
(−58.18)
−0.48
(−53.59)
Center −0.09
(−8.65)
−0.12
(−53.54)
−0.09
(−8.87)
−0.12
(−10.33)
Education 1 0.25
(25.13)
0.20
(12.85)
0.20
(20.61)
0.16
(10.78)
Education 2 0.49
(45.02)
0.40
(24.30)
0.38
(35.44)
0.33
(20.47)
Education 3 0.80
(64.65)
0.69
(37.85)
0.64
(51.19)
0.57
(31.81)
Education 4 1.46
(86.54)
1.32
(62.86)
1.12
(63.92)
1.03
(48.04)
Transformation Industry 0.21
(7.94)
0.11
(1.21)
0.16
(7.66)
0.20
(4.42)
Construction 0.11
(4.00)
0.23
(2.27)
0.09
(4.13)
0.34
(5.94)
General Industry 0.28
(8.74)
0.22
(2.15)
0.31
(10.60)
0.53
(8.26)
Commerce 0.12
(4.30)
0.09
(1.01)
0.10
(4.34)
0.19
(4.04)
Services 0.10
(3.74)
−0.02
(−0.20)
−0.03
(−1.22)
0.09
(1.98)
Transportation 0.38
(13.67)
0.33
(3;38)
0.25
(11.07)
0.35
(6.27)
Social Services 0.10
(3.50)
−0.01
(−0.07)
0.10
(3.82)
0.19
(4.33)
Public Administration 0.34
(12.31)
0.24
(2.53)
0.07
(3.07)
0.30
(6.48)
Other Activities 0.25
(9.23)
0.26
(2.79)
0.16
(7.23)
0.34
(7.25)
Occupations 2 digits Yes Yes No No
Occupations 3 digits No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.5177 0.4994 0.57 0.5627
Number of Observations 70440 43320 70440 43320
Between parentheses are the t-statistics for each coefficient. All
regressions have robust standard errors estimations
All estimations are weighted by the individual weight available in
the database.
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Education dummies are the third control variables. For both men and
women, wage increases with education. The impact of education is consis-
tently greater for males than females throughout the categories and years.21
Finally, there is the occupation and industry impact on wages. We used
two different types of classification for occupational choice. The usual and
more appropriate one has a three-digit classification. Because it has too many
groups, its analysis is excessively intricate. Therefore, for each year, we run
a regression with occupational choice divided on two-digit and three-digit
classifications.22 Columns (1) and (2) in Tables 5 through 7 display the former
results and columns (3) and (4) of each table display the latter ones. Table 8,
regarding 2007 data, has more columns, to include controls that were not
available on previous years. Therefore, in Table 8, the controls for occupation
in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) have a two digit classification and the other
columns have a three digit classification. The more restricted classification of
occupation interferes with the results of other variables. This is true for the
results by industry, which is our next focus.23
Industry indicators are fewer, and we can see a tendency in the estimated
coefficients. For males, the industrial sector pays more. For females, pub-
lic administration confers more wage benefits than other occupations. These
effects may be a combination of discrimination with a gender comparative ad-
vantage. Bergmann (1974) established a model to test the profitability func-
tion of occupation discrimination against its sociological purpose. She con-
cluded that the latter may have a bigger influence on decision-makers. Using
her model, we can conclude that activities with a greater social impact appear
to suit women better, and that those where technical appeal is stronger suit
men better. Therefore, recruiters prefer to place individuals in jobs associated
with the characteristics of their gender (Hochschild 2003).
It is also important to control for diverse factors (included in the regres-
sions presented here) to really observe effects that are conditional on other
individual characteristics. For example, Table 3 compares gender wage dif-
ferentials by industries without other controls. In that table, we observe that
men earn higher wages than women in almost all industries. Observing Table
5, columns (1) and (2) the first table with regression results, we see that, with
poorer controls for occupations, the results stay the same. In other words,
in certain industries, women are shown to receive lower pay than men when
controls on occupation are poor. However, when we use occupations discrim-
inated on three digits, the results change. For example, the “Transformation
Industry,” which showed a significant premium for males in Table 3 and on
columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, has a bigger premium for females than males
agribusiness and the lumber industry took root.
21The same result was found using quantile estimation in Santos & Ribeiro (2006).
22The estimated coefficients for this category are not in the tables, since they would take too
much space. However, the results show that women are better remunerated in occupations where
they are a very small minority, such as the military, and that they have a smaller wage premium
than men in categories where they are numerous, such as technical occupations. Full results are
available upon request.
23We also tried to estimate the impact of occupational choice on the gender wage gap. How-
ever, for the chosen years, the result is very unstable, with anywhere from 13% to 164% of the
gap being explained by occupational choice. The explanation for these results so dissimilar is
probably related to different sample compositions of PNAD along years. Future research should
be conducted using a different database – one suggestion is the Decennial Census data – that
permits a more consistent analysis of this effect.
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when better controls for occupation are in place.
For the 2007 data, we also created an additional model that includes race, a
manager indicator and tenure on the job. The results are presented in columns
(5) and (6) of Table 8. The variables analyzed earlier maintain their impact
and significance. The included variables have significance for both men and
women. The race impact demonstrates that Asian individuals earn higher
wages than other races. Tenure on the job is another variable that consistently
increases wages. However, in this case, the impact on female wages is greater
than on male wages. Staying for more than 5 years in the same job has a
positive impact on male and female wages; however, the impact on women’s
wages is 5 percent greater.24 This result is very interesting because it may
reflect women’s need to use their labor participation constancy to signal that
they wish to continue in their jobs. Intermittency is one special characteristic
of the labor market for women. For many years, women used to work only
before getting married or, in some cases, until having the first child. However,
today, both maternity leave benefits and the degree of effort women put into
their education make remaining in the labor market after having a family
possible. Even so, employers may doubt this intention and only reward those
women who are able to demonstrate their constancy. This effect appears to be
the same as the one posed by Spence for education (Spence 1973).
Finally, the “manager effect” has no significant impact for either men or
women. Our result is similar to that of Budig & England (2001), who did not
find a significant effect of the variable authority on wages.
These results point to better conditions for females in the Brazilian labor
market; however, they are by nomeans conclusive. One way to discover better
answers is to use the Oaxaca decomposition, as shown in equation (4). Using
the female characteristics and inputting them both on male and on female
estimated coefficients, we can compare a woman being paid “like a man” to
one paid “like a woman.” If the individual maintains all of her characteristics
but is paid differently, we have room to call this discrimination. Table 9 shows
these results for each of the four analyzed years.
For each year, we used the estimated coefficients in equations (2) and (3) to
estimate the predicted hourly wage for the women’s sample. Table 9 reports
the results without logarithmics, i.e., each value represents the predicted wage
for women considering their own characteristics inputted on both men’s es-
timated coefficients and women’s estimated coefficients. We report the dif-
ference in market remuneration for men and women by a percentage. Rows
displaying the “difference” represent the percentage of women who earn less
than men. It is important to stress that this percentage refers only to the
unexplained wage difference between genders; the portion of the difference
explained by the variables that are controlled is not in these results. All of
the predicted values were tested and were significantly different. We observe
that men earned greater wages than women in the past and continue to do so.
However, the gap was 33 percent in 1978, but dropped to just above than 16
percent in 2007. For 2007, we present two estimations: one with the equation
that retains the controls available for other years (Tables 5 to 8), and the other
with the additional controls of race, tenure and authority (Table 9). We note
that with better controls, the gender wage gap appears smaller.
24This difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 9: Oaxaca Results for the Un-
explained Portion of the Gender Wage
Gap.
Estimated Average Hourly Wage
1978
As men 14.51
As women 9.71
Difference −33.05%
1988
As men 261.57
As women 201.35
Difference −23.02%
1998
As men 1.9
As women 1.55
Difference −18.42%
2007
As men 3.97
As women 3.22
Difference −16.19%
2007 with more controls
As men 3.96
As women 3.35
Difference −15.40%
A final comment concerning these results is that we conclude that the gen-
der wage gap in Brazil is decreasing. However, this methodology cannot ad-
dress all factors that may affect the gap. Since we use a control for occupa-
tions, and the previous literature shows some evidence of gender segregation
in some occupations, we might be underestimating this difference.
5 Conclusion
As in other countries, the labor market conditions of women in Brazil are im-
proving. Labor regulation provides both the positive effect of guaranteeing
the presence of an adult in households with children, mainly through paid
maternity leave, and the negative effect of increasing informal hiring. In addi-
tion to regulation, discrimination and different preferences in hiring explain
part of the gender wage gap.
The present analysis of the Brazilian labor market shows that there is gen-
der segregation in occupations and industries; however, such segregation does
not always negatively affect women’s wages. For industries and occupations
where women receive higher remuneration than men, we observe that women
have higher education levels, indicating that their higher remuneration is due
to individual characteristics. This result is compatible with that of Madalozzo
& Martins (2007), who used quantile regression to investigate the wage gap
by conditional distribution.
Estimation results show different returns for all variables depending on
gender. Generally, women are more poorly remunerated than men when con-
trolling for individual characteristics. The Oaxaca decomposition reinforces
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this conclusion, showing that, when both have the same characteristics, men
are better paid than women. This difference in pay is decreasing but was still
a significant 15.4 percent, on average, in 2007. Compared with other studies,
the present study improves the quantification of this wage gap, showing that
the trend of a decreasing gap remains, but is losing pace overtime. Future
research on this area should consider investigating more deeply the affect of
occupation choice on the gender wage gap. For instance, Scorzafave & Pazello
(2007) demonstrated the impact of several variables on the wage gap, but also
did not focus on occupation choice. Analyzing of the impact of occupational
choice on the gender wage gap is a promising way to understand the evolution
of the female labor market.
Since women’s participation in the labor market is a decision that is en-
dogenous to remuneration of their work, this persistent difference when com-
pared to men is a potential disincentive to better education and constancy
in the market. Both conditions are dangerous to the economy: education by
perpetuating income inequality in Brazil, Bourguignon et al. (2007), and con-
stancy by appealing to women to leave the labor market more often because
of the opportunity costs of maintaining “two shifts.” Researchers and policy-
makers should pay attention to these effects and provide viable alternatives
to ensure women’s entrance into the labor market.
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